State of Utah v. Larry Helquist : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
State of Utah v. Larry Helquist : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Craig Halls; Attorney for Respondent.
Rosalie Reilly; Attorney for Petitioner.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Helquist, No. 950665 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6900
f S^%I I W * * - ' 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF A P I j g g i ^
 NQ> ^ L J ^ S : 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/ 
Respondent, 
vs, 
LARRY HELQU8ST, 
Defendant/Appi 
Petitioner. 
Case No,: 950665-CA 
Priority No.r 2 
BEPIV QRJEF OF PETITIONER 
INTERLOCUTORY A?P£AL FROM AN ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS E:7!DENC£ INVOLVING DRIVING UNDER TKE 
INFLUENCE WITH A MINOR IN THE VEHICLE, A. CLASS "A" 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED v} 4?.6-<tf 
(3)(A)<H!)fb), IN THE SEVENTH »JD>CfAL DISTRICT COURT, THE 
HONORABLE LYLE. «. ANDERSON PRESIDING. 
CRAIG HALLS 
9 0 7 97 South Main 
Monticello, Uteri 84535 
Telephone: (001) 587-/2128 
Attorney for Respondent 
ROSALIE RE3LLY 
143 South Main #9 
Post Office Box 404 
Mont Scello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (801) 537-326o 
Attorney ior Petitionee 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JUN 2 H 1996 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Authorities cited * ii 
I. INTRODUCTION . . ; 1 
II. SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2 
VI. ARGUMENT 3 
A. The Stop of Mr. Helquist Was Not 
Based On Reasonable Suspicion. 
(Reply to Point One of Respondent's 
Opening Brief) 3 
B. The Troopers Did Not Have Probable 
Cause To Arrest Mr. Helquist. 
(Reply to Point Two of Respondent's 
Opening Brief) 9 
C. The Transportation Exceed The 
Scope Of A Terry Stop. 
(Reply to Point Two of Respondent's 
Opening Brief) 10 
VII. CONCLUSION 11 
i. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
A. Cases Page 
Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) 10 
Reid v. Georgia. 488 U.S. 438 (1981) 7 
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274 
(Utah App. 1994) 4, 6 
State v. Johnson. 253 P.2d 34, 38 (1993) 6 
State v. Nvauen. 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. 1994) 2, 6, 7, 8 
State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992 ) 2, 7, 8 
ii. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/ 
Respondent, 
vs. 
LARRY HELQUIST, 
Defendant/Appellant/ 
Petitioner. 
Case No.: 950665-CA 
Priority No.: 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant, Larry Helquist, relies on his qpening brief and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, standards of review, case 
law and facts. Defendant/Appellant responds to the State's answer to his opening 
brief as follows: | 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Based on the State's arguments, Defendant/Appellant supplements his 
statement facts as follows: 
Trooper Halls indicated that Mr. Helquist's speech was somewhat slurred. 
[T. 14] Trooper Randall, on the other hand, stated that Mr. Helquist's speech was 
good. [T. 10] 
Trooper Randall testified that he advised Mr. Helquist that he (Randall) needed 
to give him field sobriety tests to determine whether he was impaired. [T. 8] 
Trooper Randall testified that he drove by Blue Mountain Foods and when he 
attempted to turn to go back, his vehicle got off the road and got stuck. [T. at 6] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State fails to address the issue of the timing between Dispatch receiving 
the call and when the troopers responded. Likewise, the State fails to address the 
issue that Trooper Hall's observations of Mr. Helquist failed to corroborate, but rather, 
flatly contradicted the caller's claim that Mr. Helquist was intoxicated. 
Even if it is determined that the call was placed by a citizen, it does not follow 
that there is an irrebuttable presumption of reliability. Likewise, foundation cannot be 
assumed simply because the caller may have been a citizen. 
The State relies on State v. Nvouen. 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah App. 1994) and 
State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992 ) for its position that sufficient 
reasonable suspicion existed to stop Mr. Helquist. It is not Mr. Helquist's position that 
otherwise innocent factors will defeat a finding of reasonable suspicion. Further, both 
Nyguen and Roth stand in sharp contrast to this case insofar as the factors set forth in 
both of those cases unquestionably established reasonable suspicion. 
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The odor of alcohol and one trooper's claim that Mr. Helquist's speech was 
slurred (which was contradicted by the other trooper), and Mr. Helquist's statement 
that he had consumed alcohol, does not rise to the level of probable cause to arrest 
Mr. Helquist. 
Finally, that the weather was inclement does not justify the non-consensual 
transportation of Mr. Helquist to the public safety building during an investigatory stop. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE STOP OF MR. HELQUIST WAS NOT BASED ON REASONABLE 
SUSPICION. 
(Reply to Point One of Respondent's Opening Brief) 
In addressing the issue of whether the Trial Court properly determined that 
reasonable suspicion existed, the State fails to address the issue of timing specific to 
when the dispatch report was received and when the troopers responded to the report. 
Rather, the State assumes that because a small red car was in the parking lot when 
Trooper Randall drove by, he "had reasonable suspicion to believe that the occupant 
of the red vehicle was the person who had difficulties within the store". (State's Brief 
at 7). 
This assumption would have more basis if there was specific information such 
as: when dispatch received the tip and when the trooper's responded; and if the caller 
would have provided dispatch with an accurate license plate number or, at least, the 
make, model, or year of the vehicle, which would have, in turn, indicated that the red 
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car in the parking lot was the same car. Otherwise, it is mere speculation to assume 
that the response was timely or that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the occupant of the red car was the same person who had difficulties in the store. 
The State also fails to address the issue that Trooper Hall's observations did 
not corroborate the tip received by Dispatch. Instead, the State suggests that Trooper 
Hall's observation of a male entering a small red car is the all the corroboration that 
was needed. That the trooper corroborated the gender as well as the size and color 
of the vehicle adds little to a reasonable suspicion analysis. Clearly, Trooper Hall's 
observations did not corroborate the claim of criminal activity: 
The State contends that Officer Lefavor corroborated 
dispatch's information by stopping an individual in the area 
who appeared to match the physical description given. We 
disagree. This is not corroboration of criminal activity, only 
of physical characteristics that by themselves have no 
relevance to criminal activity. 
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Utah App. 1994)(citations omitted). 
With respect to the issues of reliability and foundation, the State relies heavily 
on the call being made by a "citizen-informer". [State's Brief at 11-12]. The State 
contends that the caller was not a confidential informant since " their identity was 
communicated by dispatch" [State's Brief at 7]. There is no evidence to support this 
claim; the caller never identified himself or herself other than as being an employee at 
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Blue Mountain Foods.1 
Even if this was a citizen informer, such a call cannot be taken at face value. 
Although citizen informers are generally presumed reliable, law enforcement has an 
obligation to make sure that there are no circumstances that would render the 
presumption inoperable in certain situations. For instance, Dispatch would have the 
obligation to inquire as to why the person was claiming that the other was drunk: to 
find the precise basis of the knowledge in order to ferret out rumors, gossip or 
mistakes or to discover if the accusations were reported to spite the defendant. 
Likewise, the troopers were obligated to corroborate the claims of the caller. 
Here, there is no foundation for the caller's conclusion that the individual was 
intoxicated other than the odor of alcohol and the circumstance of that individual 
arguing with another employee. Also, there was an indication that the report may well 
have been to spite Defendant because of the argument that allegedly took place in the 
store. 
This issue of reliability is further complicated by the fact that the caller refused 
to identify himself or herself. That the caller identified himself or herself as an 
employee of the grocery makes little difference. This was, in effect, an anonymous 
^he State asserts that the caller was identified as the owner or an employer. 
[State's Brief at ] In paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Court's Findings, the caller was 
identified as a employee. 
5 
call.2 
In Case, this Court underscored the importance of having an anonymous 
caller's claim substantiated: 
[T]he court allowed a stop based on anonymous information 
that was substantiated by the investigating officer's personal 
observations of suspicious activities. Responding to a call 
reporting a "suspicious cream-colored Ford Thunderbird," 
the officer observed a car matching this description driving 
away from behind a store before business opened, driving 
slowing with the trunk lid ajar. 
Id 884 P.2d at 1279, fn 10, citing State v. Johnson. 253 P.2d 34, 38 (1993) 
Here, Trooper Halls parked up the street and watched Mr. Helquist walk out of 
the store, get in his vehicle, start the vehicle and back out of the stall. Trooper Hall's 
observations did not corroborate the call received by Dispatch, rather his observations 
contradicted the call insofar as he did not observe any conduct consistent with Mr. 
Helquist being under the influence, such as staggering or unsteady balance.. 
The State recites the factors set forth in State v. Nyguen. 878 P.2d 1183 (Utah 
App. 1994), in support of its claim that the stop of Mr. Helquist was based on 
reasonable suspicion and the States places great emphasis on the fact that none of 
the factors set forth in Nyguen are per sa illegal. [State's Brief at 10-11]. 
It is not Mr. Helquist's position that an investigatory stop is defeated by the fact 
^his is not to suggest that an anonymous call is unreliable because of the 
anonymity. Case. 884 P.2d 1279, fn. 1 
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that none of the factors are persa illegal or by the mere existence of an innocent 
explanation for any one of the factors. Rather, the validity of an investigatory 
detention must be treated as a fact specific question. To hold otherwise would mean 
that all that is required to justify a seizure is a list of factors, regardless of whether any 
of those factors were flippant. To determine if a factor is flippant, innocent 
explanations must be taken into account. Likewise, the meaning of each factor must 
be analyzed. See Reid v. Georgia. 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 
(1980)(Cannot base reasonable suspicion on factors which describe a large category 
of presumably innocent travelers.) 
The State takes the position that the instant case is parallel to Nyguen and has 
more justification than the factors set forth in State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 
1992). [State's Brief at 12-13] Such a position is inane. 
In Nyguen. the underlying factors were communicated to the dispatcher and to 
such a degree that all of the factors, unquestionably, constituted reasonable suspicion. 
There, several Asian individuals were linked to the theft of quarters out of a 
video machine in Price, Utah. Nvauen. 878 P.2d at 1184. Approximately two weeks 
later, in Spanish Fork, Utah, a 'business woman called law enforcement and stated 
that she was approached by an Asian individual, who offered to sell her a large 
quantity of quarters (300 rolls) "and she purchased two rolls, id She further indicated 
that the quarters that she received were rolled up in yellow notebook paper. ]d She 
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stated that there were three other Asian individuals in the car and she provided a 
description and license plate number ot he car. id The dispatchers called other 
businesses in that area and learned that they had also been approached about the 
quarters, id. at 1185. In addition, the dispatchers confirmed the report of the burglary 
in Price, Utah and the identity of the owner of the vehicle, who was listed as having a 
suspended license, id On the strength of these factors, an "attempt to locate" 
bulletin was broadcasted, id 
Likewise, in Roth, there was a detailed foundation in support of the conclusion 
that Roth was intoxicated: Two hospital security officers observed Roth get "vocal" 
with a hospital employee and noted that his eyes were glazed, his speech was slurred, 
he smelled strongly of alcohol and he had trouble standing, id 827 P.2d at 256. One 
of the security officers followed the defendant out to the parking lot and watched him 
get into a red Pontiac Fiero where he repeatedly try to start the vehicle, drove a few 
feet before stalling and then jerked to a stop, id at 256. In addition, the arresting 
officer independently observed the defendant experiencing difficulty driving the vehicle. 
Thus, the factors set forth in both Nyauen and Roth were articulable and 
objective facts which led to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant(s) were 
engaged in criminal activity. 
Here, a call was made to indicate that a male, driving a small red car, smelled 
of alcohol and was in an argument with an employee of Blue Mountain Foods. 
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Dispatch failed to elicit more detail as to the caller's conclusion that Mr. Helquist was 
drunk call was made that lacked foundation and reliability. There is no indication of 
the timing between Dispatch receiving this call and when the troopers responded. 
One of the troopers noted that a small red car was in the parking lot. The other 
Trooper watched Mr. Helquist walk out of the store, to his vehicle, get in the vehicle, 
and back out of the parking stall. There was no indication whatsoever that Mr. 
Helquist had any difficulty whatsoever. Nonetheless, Mr. Helquist was immediately 
stopped. The trooper's lacked reasonable suspicion for stopping him. 
B. THE TROOPERS DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST MR. 
HELQUIST. 
(Reply to Point Two of Respondent's Opening Brief) 
The State takes the position that the troopers had probable cause to arrest Mr. 
Helquist based on the following: strong smell of alcohol, Mr. Helquist's statement that 
he had four to five beers, and that one of the troopers noticed that Mr. Helquist had 
slurred speech. [State's Brief at 14] 
There was also information available to the trooper's that Mr. Helquist was not 
impaired: he was not staggering, showed no unsteady balance, nor did he have any 
problems operating the vehicle. Although Trooper Halls stated that Mr. Helquist's 
speech was somewhat slurred, [T. 14] Trooper Randall stated that his speech was 
good. [T. 10] Trooper Randall also advised Mr. Helquist that he (Randall) needed to 
give him field sobriety tests to determine whether he was impaired. [T. 8] 
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Considering the totality of the circumstances, the troopers were obligated to 
gather more facts rather than arresting Mr. Helquist and conducting additional 
investigation at the public safety building. 
C. THE TRANSPORTATION EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF A TERRY STOP 
(Reply to Point Two of Respondent's Opening Brief) 
In the alternative, the State claims that the transportation of Mr. Helquist to the 
public safety building was permissible under a "Terry" stop.3 [State's Brief at 15]. The 
transportation of a suspect even a short distance is more intrusive than a stop. As a 
matter of common sense, the non-consensual transportation of a suspect to a police 
station, as opposed to conducting the investigation at the scene, takes the police 
conduct outside the "Terry" rule. 
In Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 LEd.2d 229 (1983), the 
United States Supreme Court held that moving a suspect from the public concourse in 
an airport to a private room approximately forty feet away, while holding the 
individual's identification and airline ticket, was an illegal arrest because it was not 
supported by probable cause. Clearly, moving a suspect five blocks away from the 
scene is not a de minimis intrusion, rather, it is an arrest that must be supported by 
probable cause. 
3The State also states that Appellant consented to go to the Public Safety Building. 
The Trial Court found that the transportation was non-consensual (Findings at paragraph 
23]. 
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The State also relies on the inclement weather as the basis for transporting Mr. 
Helquist to the public safety building. The State relies on the conditions in the parking 
lot as being "slushy and wet, to the extent that one of the Highway Patrolmen became 
suck trying to turn around." [State's Brief at 8]. There is absolutely no indication that 
Trooper Randall got stuck in the parking lot. There was no testimony about the 
condition of the parking other than it being wet and slushy. Presumably, it had to 
have been clear in places because there was no indication that Mr. Helquist has any 
problems walking to his car and backing his car out of the parking stall. Trooper Halls 
testified that he stopped Mr. Helquist in the parking lot and there was no indication 
that Trooper Halls had any problems with the conditions in the parking lot. 
Assuming arguendo, there were problems with the conditions in the parking lot, 
the State totally ignores the fact that there were places near the stop, where the field 
sobriety tests could have been performed. 
The decision to transport Mr. Helquist to the public safety building exceeded the 
limits of a "Terry" stop. That there was inclement weather is not sufficient justification 
for such an intrusive measure. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the Trial Court's denial of 
Defendant's Suppression Moticfi. 
DATED this « 2 ^ day of June, 1996 
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